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Abstract
The influence of financial deepening on income inequality in developed economies is studied
with particular interest in the European Union member states that have large penetration
of bank credit. Building on the model of financially open economies (Kunieda et al., 2014)
and extending its implications for the top-income shares, it is shown that a simultaneous
increase in private bank credit relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gap
between real interest rate and GDP growth rate increases inequality, as measured by both
the Gini index and the top-income shares. To establish the effect on the top-income shares,
a simultaneous estimation procedure is proposed that exploits the implications of the fact
that a higher income range is well-characterized by the Pareto distribution.
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1 Introduction
In many developed economies, income inequality has increased sharply during the recent
decades (see, for example, OECD, 2015). This increase is often connected with several
intensive and intertwined processes that can be observed during this period, including
the technological and skill-bias change, globalisation, financial deepening, and so on (see
ibid.). This paper considers the contribution of financial deepening to income inequality in
developed economies, stressing the importance of its interaction with the difference between
the (lending) interest rate and the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate.
Taken separately, this difference (’r−g’) plays a central role in the framework of inequality
as advanced by Piketty (2014) (see also Piketty and Zucman, 2015). However, to our
knowledge, the importance of its interaction with the financial deepening has not been
explored while, intuitively, the difference r − g and, maybe even more importantly, its
sign signal if an economy fails/succeeds to generate sufficient income growth to cover the
obligations to the financial sector. In the latter case, the benefits from financing is spreading
to the whole economy instead of concentrating mostly within the finance sector; that is,
benefiting mostly the owners and workers of it. At the same time, greater net returns
could make capital owners more capable and/or willing to share the surplus with workers
in comparison with the situation where interest rates are squeezing their profits. Thus the
influence of the financial deepening on income inequality might be conditional.
Most theoretical models, at least of a closed economy, predict that the removal of financial
constraints and increasing amounts of borrowing lead unconditionally to the reduction of
income inequality (see, for example, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galor and Zeira, 1993)
or at least for more developed countries due to the inverted U-shape relationship in terms
of development level (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1993). The previous econometric evidence,
especially using earlier data periods, also corresponded rather well with these predictions
(see, for example, Levine, 2005, Clarke et al., 2006, Beck et al., 2007, Kim and Lin, 2011).
Recently, contrary empirical findings have started to accumulate evidence that a larger
financial deepening may actually have increased inequality instead of reducing it (see, for
example, Claessens and Perotti, 2007, Kunieda et al., 2014, Denk and Cournede, 2015, Haan
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and Sturm, 2016, Jauch and Watzka, 2016). This paper uses private bank credit to GDP as a
financial deepness indicator and it contributes to the empirical literature on income inequality
by: a) exploring several panels of relatively homogeneous developed economies; b) testing
additional implications of Kunieda et al. (2014) model of financially open economies for the
Gini-based inequality and linking them to the r − g impact on inequality; c) extending the
implications of the model also for the top-income shares; and d) proposing a joint estimation
procedure for the top-income shares which exploits the fact that a higher income range is
well-characterized by the Pareto distribution.
The consideration of many countries at various levels of economic development might be
tailored (and very useful) for the identification of the factors that are crucial for development;
that is, the factors explaining the differences of inequality at lower and higher income levels.
However, this might hide the drivers of inequality in developed economies alone because they
might be dominated or insufficiently strong to be observable in a mixed sample of countries.
Consequently, this paper concentrates only on the developed economies. Namely, several
panels are under consideration of countries entering the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), as well as the most
homogeneous set of countries from the Economic and Monetary Union that originated the
union (EMU1999). The interest in the EU and, especially, the EMU1999 member states
emerges mainly because of their highly bank-biased financing systems (Langfield and Pagano,
2016), and also because of their higher mutual integration and similarity relative to other
countries. Consequently, it is expected that similar principles apply in countries with a
more uniform impact of financial deepening in terms of bank credit (Benczu´r et al., 2017).
Furthermore, consideration of a group of similar countries relaxes the need to control for
many variables that would otherwise be importantly shaping the differences in development.
Hence, a smaller set of other control variables is expected to be sufficient as compared with
the case where a diversity of countries is under consideration.
For the empirical analysis, the implications derived for open economies in Kunieda et al.
(2014) seem to be especially relevant in our case because the countries that are under
consideration are developed and financially open economies. Hence, this model lays the
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ground for our empirical and theoretical analysis but its predictions are extended along a
few lines.
First, relying on the Kunieda et al. (2014) model, the implications for the top-income
shares are also derived (Kunieda et al., 2014, considered only the Gini index) defining the
conditions for the top-income inequality to increase with the relaxation of the financial
constraint. Consequently, both the global inequality as measured by the Gini index and the
top-income inequality as measured by the top-income shares received by the 1%, 5%, and
10% largest income earners will be taken under consideration. This paper is concentrated
on these three shares, leaving out the even smaller ones, because a smaller share makes the
precision of the corresponding income estimate likely to be less accurate.
Second, following the main prediction by Kunieda et al. (2014) that, in financially open
economies, financial deepening leads to increasing inequality as measured by the Gini index,
this paper further tests the significance of non-linearity emerging due to the interaction
between the financial development with other components, which was not considered by
these authors in their empirical application. Using a few approximations, it is revealed to
be linked to the r − g impact on inequality through an interaction term with the financial
deepening.
As a by-product of the previously discussed model, the analysis of the sign of the impact
of ’r−g’ on inequality is performed, which is of utmost importance in the Piketty theory. In
the specification predicted by the model, the sign of the impact of r−g alone (without taking
the bank credit into account) is negative (inequality decreasing), which is consistent with the
view advanced in Krusell and Smith (2015), or Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) and which
is in contrast with the Piketty prediction. However, the interaction term of r − g with the
private bank credit share in GDP has the inequality-increasing effect whenever r > g and,
therefore, it is potentially consistent with the Piketty prediction provided that a sufficiently
large bank credit penetration coexists with the previously defined condition.
Finally, from the methodological point of view, the contribution of this paper is the
proposed simultaneous estimation of the impact of financial deepening measures on the top-
income shares that exploits the fact that a higher income range is well-characterized by the
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Pareto distribution (see, for example, Atkinson et al., 2011). This simultaneous estimation
is introduced to solve the problem of the small number of observations that is caused by that
the number of countries with the data on top-income shares is much scarcer.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some simple empirical
evidence that will motivate further econometric investigations. Section 3 draws some
predictions from the Kunieda et al. (2014) theoretical model of open economies and derives
its implications for the top-income shares. Section 4 describes the data and defines the
econometric framework that we have employed. Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Some empirical evidence
Before turning to the modeling, some stylised characterization of empirical developments is
presented1. First, concentrating on the OECD member countries (MC), Figure 1 reveals the
dynamics of the yearly medians of: i) a few income inequality measures (top-left figure); ii)
the private bank credit and its change (top-right figure); iii) the difference between the real
bank lending interest and real GDP growth rates as denoted by r − g (bottom-left figure);
and iv) the distribution of r − g (bottom-right figure). The medians are used here to soften
some peculiarities connected with the changing availability of data (partially also caused
by the changing composition of the OECD), whereas the logarithmic transformations are
applied (apart from r − g) to simplify the presentation on a single scale.
The dynamics of the yearly median inequality as measured both in terms of the overall
inequality (Gini index) and top-income inequality is quite similar. It initially decreased
(until about 1978, which is marked by a dotted vertical line in the figures on the left side).
Meanwhile, the upwards trend dominated afterwards, at least until 2009, where some changes
begin to appear, presumably in connection with the financial crisis.
At the same time, the median bank credit levels were quite steadily increasing during the
period under discussion. This is likely to be one of the reasons for the varying results that may
be found in the previously described empirical literature. Whenever one employed the early
1See Appendix A for the related data sources.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of median yearly values in the OECD member countries (MC) and the
distribution shift of ’r − g’. Note: the availability of data for different countries varies over
time.
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data period, an increasing level of bank credit could have been pointing to the reduction in
inequality levels. Meanwhile, the later periods (or whenever their weight became dominant)
would associate the increasing credit levels with the observed upwards shift in inequality.
Otherwise, there seems to be few noticeable common patterns in the dynamics of inequality
and bank credit (or its change).
In contrast, a first look at the dynamics of the median r − g values seems to indicate
more commonality with the patterns of changes of median inequality. Nevertheless, neither
the simple scatter-plots of data at country-year level (see Appendix B) nor the econometric
evidence to be presented next yield strong confirmation that in a panel of countries such
connections are highly significant. However, the interesting and important feature is that,
prior to the increase in inequality levels, the real interest rates of bank lending were almost
always smaller than the GDP growth rates (the horizontal dashed line in the bottom-left
figure identifies the threshold of their equality). Since about 1978, the GDP growth rates
became mostly lower than the real interest rates2 (the bottom-right figure presents the
distribution of r− g in the respective periods at a country-year level), whenever the general
increase of inequality also started to appear more clearly. This pattern of inequality direction
change can also be observed at a separate country level. Figure 2 illustrates this using the
Gini index of market income for Germany and the United States3.
Merging all of these features through their interaction leads to the main finding of this
paper, which will be steadily observed in the econometric estimations for both the Gini index
and the top-income shares. Namely, the impact of bank credit to GDP on income inequality
is conditional – when the real (bank lending) interest rates are greater than the real GDP
growth rate (r > g), the financial deepening in terms of larger bank credit to GDP tends to
increase income inequality. When the interest rates are smaller than the growth rate (r < g),
larger bank lending penetration can even decrease the inequality of income.
Figure 2 illustrates these effects for the OECD, EU, and EMU1999 MC in a simple
2It is possible that the increase in real interest rates was caused by the pricing of additional macro risks
connected with higher inflation and potential slumps that became apparently important after the turmoil of
oil prices and economic activity during the 1975–1979 period.
3This figure is produced and copied directly from the Standardised World Income Inequality Database
(Version 5.1) online page at http://fsolt.org/swiid/.
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 Figure 2: Dynamics of overall income inequality (Gini index) in Germany and the United
States.
scatter-plot, where the red and blue colors are used to signify whenever the r > g and r < g
conditions hold, respectively. The solid red (bold) and the dashed blue lines represent the
estimated linear relationship in a particular state4. These lines reveal a steadily positive
and higher slope of the solid (red) line—that is, whenever ’r > g’ holds—in comparison
with that of the dashed blue line—that is, whenever ’r < g’ holds—which sometimes even
becomes downwards sloping. For the EMU1999 case (the last row of figures), such a sign
switch (upwards and downwards sloping lines), connected with the r > g and r < g cases,
holds for all of the considered cases of inequality indicators. This is of interest because of
the higher homogeneity of these countries as well as, and even more importantly, because of
the heavy weight of bank finance in their economies.
4For the ”OECD, Gini” and ”EMU1999, Gini” cases (the top-right and bottom-right figures), the red and
blue lines represent the estimates after dropping the observations of outlying groups. Namely, in the case
of the OECD group, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey were omitted because their observations form the outlying
group of observations seen above the main cluster. In the case of the EMU1999 group, Italy, Spain, and
Portugal were omitted because their observations constituted the cluster above the main one. The estimated
regression lines before these omissions are colored in grey: the solid line and dotted lines represent the r > g
and r < g cases, respectively.
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In the scatter-plots, this feature is more pronounced for the top-income shares (income
shares held by 1%, 5%, and 10% largest earners) and net income Gini inequality, which
are less persistent, and are, therefore, plotted in the figure. Nevertheless, whenever the
autoregressive influence is taken into account, the econometric results for the Gini inequality
of market income will turn out to be the strongest.
These simple and otherwise unconditional scatter-plots already hint that there might
be an important difference in bank credit impact on inequality in various states when
characterised by the real bank lending interest rates and the GDP growth rates. How
significant it is and whether there is a sign switch of the impact is to be determined shortly
using further econometric refinements.
3 Some theoretical implications
In the sequel, the implications from an open economy version of the model proposed by
Kunieda et al. (2014) are employed to study the financial deepening effect on inequality.
The model is used to motivate the specifications that will be estimated later. First, the
summary of the model is presented in Subsection 3.1. Then, the implications for the Gini
index are discussed in Subsection 3.2. Finally, the results for the top-income shares are
obtained in Subsection 3.3 (the respective derivations are presented in Appendix C).
3.1 A summary of the model
In a framework with (overlapping) generations of selfish individuals5 living for the two periods
and deriving their utility from individual consumption in the second period, Kunieda et al.
(2014) introduce an endogenous growth model (due to learning by doing) with agents that
are heterogeneous in their productivity at creating individual capital. In the first period the
agents work and earn a homogeneous wage that is determined by the aggregate technology,
whereas in the second period their earnings (which are spent on consumption) depend on
individual productivity because persons endogenously choose at the end of the first period
5There is no bequest in the model.
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to become lenders (earning interest rates) or capital builders (earning from creation of
capital) depending on their private productivity, which is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]
and constant over time.
It should be pointed out that the (working) population mass (Lt) living in the first period
is homogeneous and, therefore, the heterogeneity stems from the second period generation.
Consequently, all of the results on inequality will concentrate only on it. Furthermore,
it should be also pointed out that in such a model inequality of consumption is directly
indicative of the (final) income inequality. Nevertheless, following Kunieda et al. (2014), the
following discussion is centered around the consumption patterns.
At an individual level, an agent derives utility from the second period consumption
(ct+1) and, at the end of the first period, chooses to either lend in the second period the
previously earned wage (wt) or to invest it in the creation of individual capital (kt), possibly
with additional borrowing or lending (bt < 0 or bt > 0, respectively), depending on his/her
random (uniformly distributed) productivity (φ), which is known to him/her but unobserved
by others.
Given the credit constraint bt ≤ µ1+µ , µ ≥ 0, an agent solves the following problem:
max
bt,kt
ct+1, subject to:
ct+1 ≤ φqt+1kt +Rt+1bt,
− µ
1−µwt ≤ bt ≤ wt,
kt ≥ 0, kt + bt ≤ wt,
given qt+1, Rt+1, wt > 0,
where qt+1 and Rt+1 are the next period’s real price of capital and the gross real interest
rate paid/received for the borrowed/lent means, respectively. Different productivity defines
the choice of an agent to become a lender or a borrower of capital in this economy. Namely,
when the individual productivity is sufficiently high to render the rate of return of real
capital investment higher than the interest rate on borrowing/lending, an agent becomes a
real capital investor and, therefore, also a borrower.
11
Defining a ratio φt := Rt+1/qt+1, the aggregate capital level that fully depreciates over a
period is consequently given by
Zt+1 = ktLt
∫ 1
φt
φdφ =
wt(1− φ2t )
2(1− µ) Lt,
because, for individuals with productivity φ > φt, the optimal choice is to invest by choosing
kt =
wt
1−µ and (borrowing) bt = − µwt1−µ . Whereas for less productive agents with φ ≤ φt, it is
optimal to lend the means (bt = wt) without any capital creation (kt = 0). Consequently,
the consumption of those lending and borrowing-investing is given by
ct+1 = φtαA
1
αwt (1)
and
ct+1(φ) =
φ− µφt
1− µ αA
1
αwt, (2)
respectively.
At the aggregate level, the first order conditions under the perfect competition and the
technological constraint of production
Yt = AZ
α
t H
1−α
t ,
yield further qt = αA
1
α and wt = (1−α)A 1αZt/Lt. Here, the labor force Lt is enhanced with
a learning by doing-implied augmentation parameter (yt = Yt/Lt) that yields the augmented
labor force Ht = ytLt.
It should be further pointed out that, due to the described learning by doing and
technological constraint, production satisfies Yt = A
1
αZt. Assuming a constant labor force
(Lt = L), the growth rate of such an economy is given by
gt+1 = A
1
α · κ1− φ
2
t
1− µ − 1, (3)
where κ = 1−α
2
. Hence, in an open economy where φt is exogenously given by some φ¯t < 1,
12
which will be defined shortly, an increase in µ enhances economic growth as long as µ < 1.
3.2 Implications for the Gini index
In a small open economy version of the characterised economy, the relaxation of the borrowing
constraint µ produces a larger relative amount of financing and, increases the consumption
inequality as measured by the Gini index (see Proposition 2 in Kunieda et al., 2014).
Namely, the Gini index is given (see ibid.) by
Gt =
2φ¯3t−1 − 3φ¯2t−1 + 1
3(φ¯2t−1 − 2µφ¯t−1 + 1)
, (4)
where µ represents the financial deepening and
φ¯t−1 =
R¯t
αA
1
α
∈ (0, 1). (5)
Here R¯t > 0 stands for the gross (real) borrowing costs that are exogenously given, whereas
α ∈ (0, 1) and A ≥ 0 are the aggregate capital-linked parameter and the total factor
productivity in the previously defined Cobb-Douglas production function, respectively.
Provided that the ratio is non-negative6, it is indeed clear from eq. (4) that the increasing
financial deepening (µ) increases inequality. However, the impact of µ on G depends also on
the value of φ¯t due to the interaction term in the denominator of eq. (4); that is, the product
term7 µφ¯t−1. Motivated by this and keeping in mind that technological progress is the main
driver of long-run growth, in the empirical estimations the additional interaction terms of
financial deepening with the real interest rates and growth rates will be used as proxies for
the influence connected with the nominator and denominator of eq. (5).
In particular, up to the first order effects, we can obtain the following formal guidance.
6Since the nominator of eq. (4) is always positive for the admissible values of φ¯t, the only condition for
this to hold is that µ <
1+φ¯2t−1
2φ¯t−1
. It is also clear that µ < 1 is a sufficient condition because 1 <
1+φ¯2t−1
2φ¯t−1
.
7An interesting aspect related to high(er) penetration of finance is that for larger values of µ the peak of
dG
dµ (φ¯t) shifts towards 1 in terms of φ¯t, whereas for for µ = 1,
dG
dµ is monotonically increasing in φ¯t.
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First, let rt := R¯t − 1. From eqs. (3) and (5) if follows that
φ¯t−1 = η(µ)
1 + rt
1 + gt
− η(µ)1 + rt
1 + gt
· φ¯2t−1, (6)
where η(µ) = κ
α(1−µ) . Since the positive φ¯t < 1 (see the condition in eq. (5)), it also follows
that the second term on the right side of eq. (6) with the φ¯2t−1 is only of the second order
8.
Hence, considering the first order effects, the following approximation of the interaction term
emerges9
µφ¯t−1 ≈ ηµ+ ηµrt − gt
1 + gt
, η =
1− α
2α
, (7)
leading to the appearance of ’r − g’ in the measurement of the impact10.
It is clear that, given the highly stylised model and highly nonlinear relationship in eq.
(4), we cannot expect the functional forms to hold exactly but we at least expect the signs of
the interaction terms to be correct; that is, inequality increasing whenever rt − gt is greater
than zero and vice versa. In the sequel, both the linear and the interaction terms appearing
on the right side of eq. (7) will be under consideration in the empirical estimations11.
3.3 Implications for the top-income shares
This section will give the main results about the top-income shares. Since they hold for
each fixed period, its index is dropped hereafter for the sake of simplicity of presentation
providing the generic case. The proof of Proposition 1 is contained in Appendix C, whereas
some shorter derivations are presented in the footnotes.
We denote the frequency under investigation by p ∈ [0, 1] and the consumption share of
1 − p largest consumers by Sp ∈ [0, 1]. Proposition 1 states the main implication derived
8It is also easy to derive the exact and unique positive solution
√
1+b2t−1
bt
, where bt =
1−α
α(1−µ) · 1+rt1+gt , but
it is hard to use it in simple empirical estimations due to a non-linear form and unknown parameters.
9The following sequence leads to the result:
µφ¯t−1 ≈ η(µ)1 + rt
1 + gt
µ = ηh(µ)
1 + rt
1 + gt
= ηh(µ) + ηh(µ)
rt − gt
1 + gt
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
' ηµ+ ηµrt − gt
1 + gt
,
where η = κα , and h(µ) =
µ
1−µ is a monotonically increasing function in µ with h(µ)|µ=0 ≈ µ.
10It can be further observed that, because the value of gt is in most cases close to zero,
rt−gt
1+gt
and rt − gt
will usually be good proxies for one another.
11In fact, better results are obtained using the log-transformed bank credit data for the µ.
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for the top-income shares from the Kunieda et al. (2014) model, which is summarized in
Subsection 3.1, whenever some pth frequency is under consideration12 that satisfies the
condition
p ∈ (φ¯, 1). (8)
Proposition 1. In the open economy version of the Kunieda et al. (2014) model, for any pth
frequency that satisfies condition (8), the share of consumption of the 1−p largest consumers
is given by
Sp = (1− p) 1+p−2µφ¯φ¯2−2µφ¯+1 . (9)
Corollary 1. Given µ <
1+φ¯2t−1
2φ¯t−1
, the necessary and sufficient condition for dSp
dµ
≥ 0 is13
p ≥ φ¯2. (10)
It is obvious that the condition (10) holds whenever the initial condition required in eq.
(8) is satisfied, because of the restriction given in eq. (5). In practical terms, when the value
of the considered p is larger, it becomes more feasible that the financial development will be
inequality increasing; that is, top-income shares will raise with the financial deepening.
It is again clear from eq. (9) that a higher financial penetration (a larger µ value) affects
inequality through the interaction term µφ¯. Therefore, similarly to the case of the Gini index,
we again can expect that the (interaction) terms defined in eq. (7) will be of importance.
12It should be noted that when population is ordered by the consumption size, p coincides with the quantile
of population share by the definition.
13To see this one can either differentiate eq. (9) or, the addition and subtraction of φ¯2 to/from its nominator
leads at once to Sp = (1 − p)
(
1 + p−φ¯
2
φ¯2−2µφ¯+1
)
, which is evidently an increasing function in µ for p > φ¯2,
given the admissible ranges of parameter values discussed in Section 3.2 in the two paragraphs following eq.
(5).
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4 Data and econometric specifications
4.1 Data
In the sequel, we consider the impact of financial deepening on income inequality by
separating the later one into the total inequality—as represented by the Gini index—and the
top-income inequality—as represented by the top-income shares. The Gini index data on
market income inequality is taken from the Standardised World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID)14. The top-income data are taken from the World Wealth and Income Database
(WID)15.
The financial deepening variable under consideration is the (logarithm of) domestic
bank credit to private sector relative to GDP. Two data sources are used for the bank
credit: the World Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) and the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) Credit to Non-financial Sector database. Each source has its
own advantages: the GFDD provides information on a larger set of countries, whereas the
BIS data are adjusted for structural breaks. Hence, to avoid having to make a hard choice
between a larger number of observations and, likely, more comparable data, the results with
the bank credit data from both data sources will be provided.
In addition to the real interest rates and GDP (per capita) growth rates, the usual
set of further control variables includes initial income per capita, government consumption
expenditure to GDP, trade openness to GDP, human capital, intensity of redistribution,
inflation (of consumer prices), and the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of capital account
openness16. The WDI database is a source of initial income, government consumption
expenditure to GDP, trade openness to GDP, GDP per capita growth rates, and real interest
rates of loans. The financial openness indicator is downloaded from the Chinn and Ito
indicator website17. Intensity of redistribution is measured by the absolute reduction of Gini
14See Solt (2016) for a description and comparison of the SWIID with other sources on the Gini index.
15SeeAlvaredo et al. (2016) and Alvaredo et al. (2017) for a characterisation of the respective methodology
for constructing this data set and a discussion of some new findings building on it, respectively. I thank
Stylianos Karagiannis for bringing the availability of the WID into my consideration.
16The External Wealth of Nations dataset (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) is not employed due to
missing data for later years.
17http://web.pdx.edu/ ito/Chinn-Ito website.htm
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index from market to the net Gini using the respective SWIID data. The data on human
and real capital stem from the Penn World Table18. Appendix A contains more details of
the variables and data sources that we used.
The logarithmic transformation is applied to most of the variables, except for the interest
rate, growth rates, capital openness, and inflation. The inverse hyperbolic sign transform of
CPI-based inflation is used due to the presence of negative values of inflation in some cases.
For the empirical estimations that are presented hereafter, all of the available data will
be employed. However, the resulting panels are highly unbalanced: for a few countries
and variables the series begin as early as 1965 but in most of the cases the data are only
available from much later periods. Therefore, the effective number of data varies substantially
both with the sets of countries under consideration (OECD, EU, and EMU1999) and in the
particular set of (control) variables. In the tables that will follow both the effective number
of observations and the countries under consideration will be reported.
Given that most of control variables were insignificant and quite restricting to the number
of observations, the main estimations will be presented in Subsection 5.1 only with the main
variables of interest in the regression functions. The sensitivity analysis with additional
specifications and control variables will be discussed in Subsection 5.2 and reported in
Appendix D.
4.2 Econometric specifications
In this section we will present the econometric models that were applied for the analysis
of the impact of financial deepening on total inequality measured by the Gini index and
the top-income shares, respectively. A standard dynamic panel model is employed to model
the former one. In the case of the top-income shares, there is only data available for a
few countries (e.g. only seven from the EU). Therefore, only the OECD case is considered
because it comprises the largest set of thirteen countries. Since the number of countries is
still small even in this case, a special framework is developed that overcomes the issue of a
small number of observations by jointly estimating the underlying parameters of financial
18See Feenstra et al., 2015, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt.
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deepening impact on the top-income shares by relying on certain properties that are implied
by the Pareto distribution, which is well known to reasonably characterize the actual income
data (see, for example, Saez, 2001, Atkinson et al., 2011).
The next subsection will describe how the model was applied in the case of the Gini
index and Subsection 4.2.2 will present the methodology that was applied in the case of the
top-income shares.
4.2.1 Models of the Gini index
Let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} stand for the country and period indices,
respectively. Relying on the insights from the previous sections, the following econometric
model underlies the evaluation of the impact of financial deepening on total inequality of
income in countries as measured by the Gini index:
α(L)Gi,t = β0Bi,t + β1h(ri,t, gi,t) + β2Bi,th(ri,t, gi,t) + θ
′xi,t + λi + εi,t, (11)
where:
α(L) = 1−α1L−· · ·−αkLk is a lag polynomial of order k ∈ N with real-valued parameters;
Gi,t stands for the (natural) logarithm of the Gini index;
Bi,t denotes the logarithm of private bank credit to GDP;
h(ri,t, gi,t) signifies either
ri,t−gi,t
1+gi,t
or ri,t − gi,t, where ri,t represents the real bank lending
interest rates and gi,t denotes the real growth rate;
xi,t comprises various other control variables;
λi stands for the real valued country fixed effects;
β = (β0, β1, β2)
′ and θ are real valued vectors of parameters of proper lengths;
εi,t denotes the usual zero mean error term.
Specification (11) is informative about the direction of the impact of ri,t−gi,t on inequality.
It is clear that its impact will be determined by (β1 +β2Bi,t). In connection with the Piketty
prediction of r − g impact on inequality, the expected sign condition is (β1 + β2Bi,t) > 0,
whereas the alternatives that were considered, for instance, by Krusell and Smith (2015) or
Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) the opposite would be the case.
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Given that model (11) is a dynamic panel model, the usual fixed effects estimator
is inconsistent for fixed T due to the presence of incidental parameters (Nickell, 1981).
Furthermore, inequality is also highly likely to be endogenous with financial deepening,
growth rate and/or interest rates. Therefore, we employ the generalised method of moments
(GMM) based estimator originated for the dynamic panels by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In particular, we
apply system GMM conditioning on both lags of differences and levels.
It should be noted that we use yearly data for the estimation of the models while avoiding
pre-aggregation of initial data (e.g. into periods of 5 or 10 years). Although such an
aggregation aims to capture the longer-term impact and the removal of business cycle effects,
it is rather questionable because the business cycles can differ across time and countries both
in terms of length and phases, whereas it can lead to pre-aggregation biases and result in
a substantial reduction of number of observations. However, the use of yearly data might
require us to consider more lags of the dependent variable in order to capture longer-term
developments. Therefore, the lag order of the polynomial α(L) is selected based on the
significance of the autoregressive terms.
4.2.2 Modeling of top-income shares
The Pareto distribution is known to well-characterise the top-tails of the income or wealth
distribution (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011, Blanchet et al., 2017) and, therefore, the top-
incomes can be properly characterised with a few parameters that, potentially, are time
and country varying. Furthermore, it follows that the respective top-income shares depend
only on a straightforward function of the shape parameter of the Pareto Type I distribution
besides the considered share itself (see, for example, Blanchet et al., 2017, Jones, 2015, Jones
and Kim, 2017). Hence, allowing for some random zero-mean deviation ζi,t from the Pareto
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distribution-implied shares19, for any quantile p, the share of top-income is given by
s
(p)
i,t = (100/p)
ηi,t−1 exp
(
ζ
(p)
i,t
)
, (12)
where ηi,t is an inverse of the Pareto distribution scale parameter. Here, it is allowed to be
period and country-specific and is governed by some process
αp(L)ηi,t = f(zi,t;ψ) + ε
(p)
i,t , (13)
where, potentially, the p-specific lag polynomial αp(L) = 1 − α1,pL − − αkp,pLkp , kp ∈ N,
f(zi,t;ψ) is a regression function with zi,t containing the explanatory variables and ψ is the
respective real-valued vector of parameters, while ε
(p)
i,t is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed zero mean error independent from the regression function terms. In
a special case where the variance of ε
(p)
i,t is zero, eq. (13) can also be deterministic.
It can be seen that the following normalised logarithms of income shares have the same
from of the conditional expectation as that of ηi,t. Namely,
s˜
(p)
i,t :=
ln
(
s
(p)
i,t
)
ln(100/p)
+ 1 (14)
= ηi,t + cζ
(p)
i,t
= α−1p (L)f(zi,t;ψ) + ξ
(p)
i,t ,
where the error term ξ
(p)
i,t = α
−1
p (L)ε
(p)
i,t + cζ
(p)
i,t , c
−1 = ln(100/p).
Given that the observations for the top-incomes shares of 10%, 5%, and 1% of population
with the highest income will be used next, the following system of equations will be under
19The term ζi,t is assumed to be independent of the remaining part of the process under consideration
and, formally, a p-specific upper bound on the support can be introduced as a function of ηi,t to ensure that
the shares remain below one.
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estimation: 
α1(L)s˜
(1)
i,t = f(zi,t;ψ) + ξ˜
(1)
i,t ,
α5(L)s˜
(5)
i,t = f(zi,t;ψ) + ξ˜
(5)
i,t ,
α10(L)s˜
(10)
i,t = f(zi,t;ψ) + ξ˜
(10)
i,t ,
(15)
where ξ˜
(p)
i,t = αp(L)ξ
(p)
i,t , p ∈ {1, 5, 10}. It is clear that system (15) is featured by the cross-
equation parameter restrictions.
To estimate the parameter vector ψ in such a dynamic system, we employ the GMM
by assuming further that f(zi,t;ψ) = zi,t
′ψ. It should be pointed out that, in the general
case of non-deterministic eq. (13), ξ˜
(p)
i,t contains an autoregressive component αp(L)ζ
(p)
i,t that
by the construction correlates with lags of s˜
(p)
i,t for αp(L) 6= 1; hence we exclude lags of
s˜
(p)
i,t from the conditioning set when estimating with the GMM. On the other hand, if ∃ p
s.t. αp(L) 6= 1, this specific feature would allow us to test the hypothesis that the Pareto
distribution is empirically fit to describe the shares: in such a case ζ
(p)
i,t ≡ 0 and errors of the
system under consideration were uncorrelated. Therefore, the lags of s˜
(p)
i,t would also be valid
instruments and the over-identifying restrictions would not be rejected, for example, by the
Sargan–Hansen test20. The empirical results that will be presented shortly are consistent
with such a case.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Main findings
This subsection will first report the estimation results for the Gini index of market and net
income. It will then present the findings for the joint estimation of the top-income system
of equations. In either case, the dependent variable is logarithmically transformed to reduce
the heteroscedasticity of the errors. As discussed in Subsection 4.1, both the GFDD and
the BIS data sources of the private bank credit have relative advantages and shortcomings
20See Sargan (1958), Sargan (1975), Hansen (1982).
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(larger number of countries versus potential structural breaks), consequently the results will
be reported using each data source; that is, whenever the Gini and top-income inequality
is being used as the dependent variable. In all of the cases, the robust inference relies
on standard errors adjusted for clustering by countries while the number of instruments is
approximately guided by the number of countries. To shrink the number of instruments, the
collapsed instruments with a restricted number of lags were used by projecting only on the
history of the dependent variable.
It should be noted that, aside from a few marginal cases, the instrument adequacy
regarding the employed lags and admissibility of over-identifying restrictions is not rejected
practically in all of the cases under consideration. In a few of the cases, lag shifts of dependent
variable in the instrument set were used to achieve such an outcome, otherwise the hypothesis
of the absence of the second order serial correlation21 of errors was rejected at the 5%
significance level.
Table 1 reports the results of estimation for the Gini indexes whenever only the significant
variables are kept in the regressions. Namely, the almost uniformly insignificant logarithm of
bank credit22, which is highly correlated with the interaction term, was removed. Some case-
specific insignificant lags of the dependent variable were dropped from the initial estimations
that are presented in Table D1 (see Appendix D). It should be pointed out that the results
are practically unchanged when, instead of rt−gt
1+gt
appearing in Table 1 and motivated by
the arguments presented in Section 3, the unscaled rt − gt is used for the estimations in
connection with the findings discussed in Section 2 (see Subsection 5.2 for this and various
other sensitivity checks).
Although the point estimates vary when the GFDD and BIS data of private bank credit
are used23, the general tendency is to have a significant negative sign of rt−gt
1+gt
while at the
same time the significant positive impact of its interaction term with the (logarithm) of bank
credit to GDP.
21Or more precisely, of the second order moving average term.
22It should be pointed that the same insignificance holds for the bank credit and capital openness
interaction, which is likely to happen because of relatively similar capital openness level of countries under
consideration.
23It should be pointed out that the difference can arise because the countries under consideration differ
and also because the quality of the data sources differs.
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of income variable Market Market Market Net Net Net 
Variables \ Country group OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
              
 Bank credit data source: GFDD 
       
(r-g) / (1+g) -1.440** -2.392*** -2.316*** -1.348* -1.316** -4.119 
 (0.619) (0.832) (0.829) (0.754) (0.611) (2.663) 
log(credit) * (r-g) / (1+g) 0.406** 0.604*** 0.589*** 0.304* 0.362** 0.943 
 (0.167) (0.207) (0.189) (0.178) (0.166) (0.623) 
P-val(AR2) 0.861 0.716 0.234 0.803 0.337 0.195 
P-val(Sargan) 0.0902 0.765 0.777 0.00432 0.937 0.0191 
P-val(Hansen) 0.388 0.435 0.925 0.609 0.813 0.761 
Number of instruments 33 29 12 33 29 12 
Number of countries 31 27 10 31 27 10 
Observations 721 531 172 721 531 176 
       
 Bank credit data source: BIS 
       
(r-g) / (1+g) -1.512** -5.004*** -4.238 -1.963** -7.196** -2.520 
 (0.596) (0.967) (3.328) (0.919) (2.905) (2.702) 
log(credit) * (r-g) / (1+g) 0.422*** 1.325*** 1.084 0.497** 1.843*** 0.594 
 (0.161) (0.243) (0.821) (0.226) (0.710) (0.652) 
P-val(AR2) 0.979 0.0615 0.339 0.576 0.0494 0.709 
P-val(Sargan) 0.110 0.354 0.696 0.153 0.798 0.160 
P-val(Hansen) 0.707 0.977 0.722 0.688 1 0.310 
Number of instruments 33 29 12 33 29 12 
Number of countries 27 17 10 27 17 10 
Observations 648 354 171 648 354 180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Dependent variable: logarithm of Gini index of income     
Table 1. Estimation results with the Gini index of income (line two indicates the type of income), and GFDD and BIS as 
private bank credit data sources. 
23
For instance, taking the point estimates from column (1) of Table 1 when the GFDD
data of bank credit are used (as in Figure 1), the prediction is that the inequality reducing
impact of rt−gt
1+gt
, conditionally on rt > gt, is outweighed by the interaction term whenever
the bank credit is grater than, approximately, 35 percent of GDP. Therefore, it might not
be a mere coincidence that the median bank credit in the OECD countries plotted in Figure
1 (the top-right figure) also passes this threshold around the 1976–1979 period, when the
inequality starts rising and it also becomes a norm for the real interest rates to be greater
than the corresponding real GDP growth rates.
Qualitatively, the characterised features seem to be observable when using either the
GFDD and BIS bank credit data, which also yield quite similar significance. However,
looking at the market income and net income inequality, the significance of the impact of
bank credit seems to be slightly more pronounced for the former.
Turning to the top income inequality, Table 2 reports the related estimation results.
It should be recalled that the estimates rely on the GMM estimation of the system (15)
using jointly the 1%, 5%, and 10% top-income shares. As in the case of regressions of Gini
indexes, the significance of bank credit was low and Table 2 relies on the regression with
solely persistently significant terms.
The same pattern of impact emerges as was found previously. However, the estimated
levels of bank credit to GDP rendering the total impact of ’r−g’ inequality increasing (given
r > g) is much lower (below even ten percent). In practical terms, this would suggest that
whenever the real bank lending interest rates become greater than the GDP growth rate,
inequality can be expected to rise with increasing values of r − g.
The results that rely on the GFDD data seem to be slightly more robust. However, the
use of an exponential (as in columns (5)-(8) of Table 2) and not a linear impact function
(as in columns (1)–(4)) of r − g-linked terms and relying on that, up to the first order
approximation exp(x− y)∣∣
x=y
' 1 + x− y, also leads to persistent significance with the BIS
data24. This might suggest that the influence of the interest and GDP growth rates might be
much more costly in terms of top-income inequality increase whenever larger positive gaps
24For the Gini index of market income such an improvement was not that clear.
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank credit data source GFDD GFDD BIS BIS GFDD GFDD BIS BIS 
Variables \ Presence of AR instrum. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
              
(r-g) / (1+g) -0.771*** -1.807*** -0.528*** -0.317     
 (0.0717) (0.476) (0.0595) (0.279)     
log(credit) * (r-g) / (1+g) 0.134*** 0.377*** 0.0792*** 0.0257     
 (0.0171) (0.117) (0.0134) (0.0638)     
exp{ (r-g) / (1+g) }     -1.046*** -1.181*** -0.494*** -0.616*** 
     (0.131) (0.251) (0.0532) (0.233) 
log(credit) * [exp{ (r-g) / (1+g) } - 1]     0.200*** 0.231*** 0.0731*** 0.0987* 
     (0.0317) (0.0613) (0.0121) (0.0534) 
P-val(Hansen) 0.192 0.768 0.405 0.540 0.698 0.782 0.422 0.340 
Number of instruments 15 18 15 18 15 18 15 18 
Number of countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Observations 352 352 374 359 352 352 374 359 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Dependent variable: transformation of top-income shares as defined in eq. (15).     
 
Table 2. Estimation results for the top-income shares with the GFDD and BIS private bank credit data. 
emerge between the real lending and GDP growth rates.
5.2 Some further checks
In this subsection we will check the sensitivity of the main findings reported in the previous
subsection and will present the results of the projection of r − g term on the financial
structure. The latter is important in order to understand whether the expansion of bank
credit, which is especially important in the European countries due to the central role of
banks in their financial systems, did not itself affect the gap between real interest rates and
GDP growth rates.
The sensitivity analysis is concentrated on the case of the Gini indexes because of the
25
larger number of observations, at least, for the OECD and EU groups of countries. Although
the outcome for the EMU1999 is also presented for completeness, it should be kept in mind
that the estimation precision for this group is less accurate.
In the previous section the results were obtained by omitting insignificant bank credit
variable. The initial regression from which they were obtained is presented in Table D1
of Appendix D. It can be seen that, apart from a single marginally significant case out of
twelve considered ones, the bank credit variable is insignificant. If it were significant, then
one could suspect that, for some (constant) κ ∈ R, not the ’r-g’, but ’r-g-κ’ is of importance
for inequality; that is, that the gap starts hurting even before or after the r = g threshold is
passed.
Table D2 reveals next that the use of the r − g term instead of r−g
1+g
yields practically
the same results, as was already expected in Subsection 3.2. Apart from a single case (with
the BIS credit data and Net income) whenever the significance level of the interaction term
changes from 1% to 5%, even the point estimates of coefficients are barely affected.
Tables D3 – D5 investigate the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of other control
variables. The main issue with such an exercise is the potentially insufficient number of
degrees of freedom for precise estimation of many additional parameters. We proceeded in
two way to soften this aspect.
First, in Table 3 the model is augmented with the first two principal components out of
the seven variables under consideration (i.e., capital openness, initial income per capita,
government consumption expenditure to GDP, trade openness to GDP, human capital,
intensity of redistribution, and inflation). As can be seen, apart from a single case (column
(2)), the principal components are barely significant, if at all, while the significance of the
other terms of interest is only moderately affected.
Second, using the GFDD-Market income case as a baseline having the largest number
of observation and the strongest results, the significance of individual control variables is
investigated in Tables D4 and D5 by step-wise inclusion of variables. The two tables are
used here to make their size manageable. As can be seen, the significance of the two terms
of primary interest is barely affected, while the other controls are mostly insignificant with
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probably the strongest significance revealed by government expenditure, trade openness,
and capital openness. However, their significance varies and is not uniform across different
country groups; even the signs of coefficients change. These results would suggest that, as
expected in the introduction, the countries under consideration are indeed quite similar in
terms of inequality patterns after the conditioning on the financial deepening and r − g (as
well as time-invariant factors), thus rendering the further controls under consideration less
informative.
Table D6 presents some further robustness checks of the inclusion of period effects in
the main specifications. It should be pointed out that this drastically increases the number
of parameters under estimation and even increases the minimum number of instruments
required for the identification of the model. The latter aspect makes the inference about the
empirical acceptability of the over-identifying restrictions less feasible. Nevertheless, keeping
these shortcomings in mind, one can see that the outcome with the market income Gini index
is quite similar to the main findings, whereas the significance of the results with the Gini
index of net income vanishes.
Finally, Table D7 investigates, whether the bank credit and the finance composition
(bank credit to stock market capitalisation and bank credit to outstanding debt securities25)
has any influence on26 the r−g
1+g
, which now becomes the dependent variable. It is clear that
this is very tentative because many other factors can be connected with the riskiness of the
environment and so can play a role, and would be worth studying further27. However, even
such a simple projection reveals that bank credit (to GDP) itself is not significant, whereas
its ratio to the stock market capitalisation turns out to be highly significant. Consequently,
it looks like the gap between the interest rates and GDP growth rates is influenced by the
finance composition.
25It should be pointed out that the logarithms of these ratios are used together with the logarithm of bank
credit level in order to insure that there is no bias due to the usage of the ratios.
26The results with r − g are again almost equivalent.
27Although a preliminary examination of bank concentration and riskiness measures did not yield the
expected results.
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6 Concluding remarks
Our analysis of both the Gini indexes of market and net income, and also the top-income
shares points to that the impact of the financial deepening as measured in terms of private
bank credit on income inequality, which is conditional on the sign and size of the gap between
the real (bank lending) interest rates and the real GDP growth rates. Our estimates show
that the bank credit expansion under r > g increases inequality as measured by all indicators,
which is consistent with the prediction derived from the Kunieda et al. (2014) model.
From the policy perspective, this implies that, in principle, inequality can be reduced
by either shrinking the amounts of bank credit under the positive gap or seeking for some
structural policies that, even under the same amount of bank credit, would ensure that the
real GDP growth rates are above the real lending rates. The latter alternative seems to be
very attractive because ’bad credit’ might soon become inequality reducing under r < g.
Therefore, further understanding of the ’r − g’ gap drivers is needed. A preliminary
attempt in this paper that looked only at the contribution of relative financing sources
suggests that fostering stock markets can be a desirable solution because a larger stock
market capitalisation relative to bank credit was shown to be r − g reducing. At the same
time, the dependence of r − g on the structure of finance means that the total impact of
expansion/reduction of bank credit on inequality ceteris paribus can be even stronger than
revealed by the estimated equations due to the presence of indirect impact (through r − g).
The presence of the established interaction term of bank credit with the gap also has
some implications for the discussion about the sign of the r−g impact on income inequality.
Whenever r < g, the sign of r− g impact on inequality as measured by both the Gini index
and top-income shares is negative. Given that r > g, which was the predominant case during
the latest few decades, the impact of r− g on inequality is conditional on credit penetration.
For instance, the impact of r − g on the Gini index of market income, as estimated from
the OECD MC sample, is negative until bank credit to GDP reaches approximately 35% of
GDP. Afterwards, the interaction-driven term dominates and larger r− g leads to increasing
inequality. For the top-income shares, this bank credit share in GDP threshold seems to be
even lower.
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In the case of the top-income inequality, some statistical evidence would indicate that the
difference between the real interest and GDP growth rates can have a stronger than linear
impact. Therefore, the increasing r− g might be more costly in terms of inequality; at least,
as measured by the top-income shares.
The dependence of bank credit impact on income inequality on the r − g is fascinating
because it implies that countries with the same path of credit can reach very different
outcomes. For instance, if some Southern European countries faced additional risk premiums
that increased this gap, then their inequality would be expected to reach higher levels than
in countries with lower risk premiums28, given similar or even lower bank credit penetration.
At the same time, this suggests that the financial integration of some Central and Eastern
European countries into the EU could have softened the increase of inequality that was
associated with the quick increase of bank credit penetration in these countries.
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7.1 Appendix A: Variables and data sources.
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7.2 Appendix B: Inequality–interest rates and inequality–bank
credit scatter-plots.
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Figure 4: Inequality—interest rates scatter-plot.
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Figure 5: Inequality—interest rates scatter-plot (first differences).
35
llllll
ll
l
llll
lll l
l
l
l
l l
lllllll
ll
lllll
lll
ll
ll
llll l lll
l lllll l lll l lllll
lll
lll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll l ll
ll
ll
ll
lllll
lll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
l l
lllllll llllll l l
l
llll
ll
llll
lllll
lll
l l l
ll
l
lllll
l
ll
lll
ll
ll
llll
l
ll
l l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
lll
lll
ll
l
llll
llll
l l
llllll
ll
l lllll
l
l ll
ll
lllll
l
ll
ll
ll
ll
l
ll
lllll
l
ll
lllll
l
l
l
l l
lll
ll ll
ll
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
ll l ll l
ll
l
ll
ll
l llllll
l
lllll l l l l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l l
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
llll l ll
lll
lll
l l
l ll
ll
lll
ll llll
lll
ll
lll
ll
ll
llll
l
llll
ll
ll
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5
3.
0
3.
2
3.
4
3.
6
3.
8
Top`10%
logarithm of bank credit to GDP
to
p 1
0%
 in
c. 
sh
ar
e (
log
)
ll
lllll
lll
l
lllllll l
l
l
l
l l
ll
lll
ll
lllllll
lll
ll
ll
llll l llll lllll l lll l
llll
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l l ll
ll
ll
ll
lllll
lll
l ll l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
lll
ll
l
lllll llllll l l
l llllll
lll
lll
lllll
lll
l l ll
ll
ll
ll
llllll
ll ll
l
lllll
llll
ll
l
lll
llll
l
ll
ll
l llll
lll
l l
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l l
l
ll
llllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll ll
ll
l ll
l
l
l l l
l llllllll l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l llllll
ll
lll l l l l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
ll
l
lll ll
lllll
l
l
ll
lll
l l ll
lll
ll
llll
l ll
ll ll
ll
l llllll
llll
ll
l
lll
ll
ll
ll
lll
l
llllll
l
l
l
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5
2.
6
2.
8
3.
0
3.
2
3.
4
3.
6
Top`5%
logarithm of bank credit to GDP
to
p 5
%
 in
c. 
sh
ar
e (
log
)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
lll
lllllllll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
ll
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
llllllllll
ll
l l
l
l
l
lllllll l
ll
lll
ll
ll
lll
ll ll
l l
lllllll
l
l
lllll
ll
l l l
llllll
l
llll
lll lllll
lll
ll
ll l l l ll
l
l
l
l
llll
ll
ll
l
ll
llll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
lll l l lll
lllll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l ll
l
l
ll
l
l ll l
l
l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll l
l l
l
llllll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
lllll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l l
ll
lllllllll l l
llllll
l
llllll
lll l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
llllll l l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l l
l
llll
lll
ll
l ll l l
l l
ll
ll
l
llll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l l l
l lll
l l l
ll
ll
ll
llll
l
ll
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
llllll
lllll l
l
l
ll
llllllll l
llllll
l
ll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l l
l llll
lllllll
l l
l
ll
ll
l lll
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
lll
lll
l
l
l ll
l
l
lllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l llll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l ll
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
ll l
lllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
lll l l
lll
l
l l
l l
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
l
l
2 3 4 5
3.
2
3.
4
3.
6
3.
8
4.
0
Gini (market income)
logarithm of bank credit to GDP
Gi
ni 
of 
ma
rke
t in
co
m
e 
(lo
g)
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l lll l l
llllll
llllll
lllll
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
ll
lll
lll
l
l
ll lll l
l
l
l
l
lllllllll
l
l
l
l
l
lllll l lll ll
ll
ll l l ll lllllllll
ll
ll
l l llllll l
ll
ll llll
l
lll
ll
lll l lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lllllll
lll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
ll l lll
lll
llll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
lll llllll lll
ll
ll
l ll l l ll l l l ll l lll
ll
l
l
l llll
ll lll
ll
ll
lllll
l ll
l
l
l l
llll
lllll
l l llll
l l l
lllllll
ll lllll
l
l
llll
llll l l lll l l
l l
l
ll
l
l
ll
llll l
l
l l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll l
l l l lllll
l
ll
ll
l
ll l
l l
llll
llll
lllll
l
llll
l
ll
llll ll llll
l
l
l
lll
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
ll
lllllll lll l ll
lll l
llll
l
ll l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l lllllllllll llll
l
l
l
lll l
ll
l
l
lll l l llll
l
l l
l
ll
ll l
l
l ll
ll
lll
lll
l
l l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll l
l
l
l
ll l l l
llll
l
l
l
l l
llll l l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
ll ll
l
llll
l
llll
ll l lllll l l l l ll l l l
l l
l
ll
ll
ll llll
2 3 4 5
2.
6
3.
0
3.
4
3.
8
Gini (net income)
logarithm of bank credit to GDP
Gi
ni 
of 
ne
t in
co
me
 (lo
g)
Figure 6: Inequality—bank credit scatter-plot (log-level).
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Figure 7: Inequality—bank credit scatter-plot (first differences of log-level).
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7.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1.
Given that the analysis is performed for each fixed period t separately, hereafter the time
index is dropped for simplicity of presentation. Consider first the consumption of ”investors-
borrowers” relative to that of ”lenders” using eqs. (2) and (1), respectively:
c(φ)
c
=
φ−µφ¯
1−µ · αA
1
αw
φ¯αA
1
αw
=
φ
φ¯
− µ
1− µ =: b(φ) ⇒ c(φ) = b(φ)c. (16)
Hence, given that productivity is uniformly distributed with the mass L and consumption
is linear in productivity for φ > φ¯, the total consumption of population belonging to the
1− p share of largest consumers is given by
Cp = L
∫ 1
p
c(φ) dφ
= Lc
∫ 1
p
b(φ) dφ
= Lc
∫ 1
p
φ
φ¯
−µ
1−µ dφ
= Lc
(
1−p2
2φ¯(1−µ) − µ(1−p)1−µ
)
= Lc 1−p
1−µ
(
1+p
2φ¯
− µ
)
= Lc(1−p)
1−µ
1+p−2µφ¯
2φ¯
,
assuming that p > φ¯ is under consideration and, therefore, eq. (16) is functional.
Also taking into account eq. (1), from the average consumption (c¯) expression provided
in Kunieda et al. (2014), it easily follows that, in an open economy, the average consumption
is given by
c¯ =
c
φ¯
· φ¯
2 − 2µφ¯+ 1
2(1− µ) .
Hence, the consumption share of population belonging to the 1−p share of largest consumers
is given by
Sp =
Cp
Lc¯
= (1− p) 1 + p− 2µφ¯
φ¯2 − 2µφ¯+ 1 .
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7.4 Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis of estimations.
Table D1 — The initial regression of the main specification.
Table D2 — The estimation results with r − g instead of r−g
1+g
.
Table D3 — The estimation with the two principal components of the control variables.
Table D4 — The estimation results with the additional control variables (to be continued in
Table D5).
Table D5 — The estimation results with additional control variables (second part as the
continuation of Table D4).
Table D6 — The estimation results with period dummies.
Table D7 — The finance composition impact on (r-g)/(1+g).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank credit data source GFDD GFDD GFDD BIS BIS BIS 
Variables \ Country group OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
log(bank credit) -0.0396 -0.000465 -0.0724 -0.0161 -0.0232 -0.0476 
(0.0286) (0.0231) (0.0540) (0.0387) (0.0290) (0.0327) 
log(bank credit / stock market) 0.0400** 0.0211*** 0.0194* 0.0431** 0.0273*** 0.0162* 
(0.0186) (0.00672) (0.0105) (0.0189) (0.00763) (0.00918) 
log(bank credit / debt securities) 0.00201 0.0110 0.000946 0.0176 0.00724 0.00196 
(0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0469) (0.0208) (0.0136) (0.0317) 
First lag of dep. var. 0.430*** 0.694*** 0.743** 0.242** 0.667*** 0.770*** 
(0.133) (0.0975) (0.329) (0.116) (0.103) (0.228) 
Second lag of dep. var. -0.140 -0.134* -0.0946 -0.135 -0.116 -0.159 
(0.0895) (0.0719) (0.154) (0.0919) (0.0817) (0.136) 
Third lag of dep. var. 0.0846 0.0454 -0.0533 0.0816 0.00218 -0.115** 
(0.0701) (0.0625) (0.147) (0.0610) (0.0774) (0.0582) 
Constant 0.170 -0.0126 0.320 0.0593 0.0908 0.210 
(0.125) (0.105) (0.277) (0.170) (0.134) (0.145) 
P-val(AR2) 0.126 0.357 0.652 0.362 0.375 0.269 
P-val(Sargan) 0.0607 0.174 0.205 0.00217 0.358 0.208 
P-val(Hansen) 0.658 0.781 0.501 0.842 0.998 0.724 
Number of instruments 33 29 12 32 29 12 
Number of countries 405 238 122 400 204 121 
Observations 28 22 10 25 16 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: (r-g) / (1+g) 
Table D7. The finance composition impact on (r-g)/(1+g). 
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